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Competition and State aid implications of the Spezzino Judgment (C-113/13): the scope 
for inconsistency in assessing support for public services voluntary organisations 
Dr Albert Sanchez Graells
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
The rules applicable to the financing of public services (lato sensu) are a permanent source of 
legal challenge under EU law. Despite the clarification of the distribution of competences 
between the Member States and the European Union attempted by the TFEU and its Protocol 
(No 26) on services of general interest,
2
 the boundaries of the constraints that EU law 
imposes on the organisation, commissioning and financing of the provision of public services 
remain relatively blurry;
3
 particularly where non-public providers are involved, and specially 
where voluntary (third sector, non-profit) organisations receive support (in the form of 
financing, contracts, etc) from the Member States. 
The Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the recent 
Spezzino case
4
 has created additional uncertainty
5
 by determining that as a matter of principle 
EU law does not preclude “national legislation … which provides that the provision of 
[certain social] services must be entrusted on a preferential basis and awarded directly, 
without any advertising, to the voluntary associations covered by [sectoral] agreements, in so 
far as the legal and contractual framework in which the activity of those associations is 
carried out actually contributes to the social purpose and the pursuit of the objectives of the 
good of the community and budgetary efficiency on which that legislation is based”.6 
The uncertainty deriving from the Spezzino Judgment is particularly acute regarding 
the rules applicable to the choice of provider and the remuneration payable for the provision 
of those services by voluntary (third sector, non-profit) entities, in particular where they 
develop their activities within a legal and contractual framework aimed to ensure that they 
“actually contribute to the social purpose and the pursuit of the objectives of the good of the 
community and budgetary efficiency”,7 as established by the domestic legislation of the 
Member States. Such entities seem to be exempted from the general requirements for the 
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selection and remuneration of public service providers and, in particular, the so-called fourth 
Altmark condition that “where the undertaking which is to discharge public service 
obligations is not chosen in a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation 
needed [for the provision of the service] has been determined on the basis of an analysis of 
the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with [material] 
means […] so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have 
incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a 
reasonable profit for discharging the obligations”.8 Indeed, after Spezzino, where the 
voluntary entities are not chosen following a public procurement procedure (so as to ensure 
that they are the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the 
community), they seem to also not be subjected to the ‘Altmark benchmarking’ against the 
economic standard of a “typically efficient undertaking”. Instead, they are subjected to the 
rather different and potentially much lower Spezzino standard of “contribution to budgetary 
efficiency”—which, in any case, is a new test riddled with interpretive difficulties.9 
A permissive interpretation of the Spezzino Judgment and the criterion of 
“contribution to budgetary efficiency” could potentially deactivate a significant number of 
secondary State aid law requirements applicable to the remuneration for the provision of 
public services under the Almunia Package
10—particularly the 2012 Decision on public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest
11—as well as create further uncertainty as to the relevance of the 
Altmark doctrine when the commissioning of the provision of public services falls on 
voluntary, third sector (or) non-profit organisations. Hence, this aspect of the Spezzino case 
deserves some careful consideration. 
Moreover, it is worth stressing that the Spezzino solution is functionally in contrast 
with the consolidated line of case law whereby the CJEU has stressed that the non-profit 
nature of the entity being awarded a public contract is incapable of altering the rules 
applicable to such an award where such entity engages in economic activity in competition 
with other (types of) providers. As recently stressed in the Centro Hospitalar de Setubal 
case,
12
 there is no reason to exclude from the full application of EU public procurement rules 
the award of contracts for the provision of public services to entities that “despite their status 
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as social solidarity institutions carrying out non-profit activities, are not barred from 
engaging in economic activity in competition with other economic operators”.13 
Given that the voluntary associations preferred by the Italian scheme contested in 
Spezzino can engage in economic activity of a commercial and productive nature—which, 
albeit of a theoretical ‘incidental’ nature,14 actually represents more than 25% of their total 
average turnover (with some relevant variation, as the average is of around 17% for 
healthcare services and 30% for social services)
15—this is a second area of potential clash 
between the approach in Spezzino and in the pre-existing case law of the CJEU on the award 
of public contracts to voluntary and non-profit organisations that also deserves criticism. 
This paper focusses on these two sets of issues. It first provides some discussion on 
the uncertainty created by the Spezzino Judgment (§2). It then focusses on the issue of the 
economic efficiency / cost-effectiveness standard applicable to the commissioning and 
financing of public services to voluntary, third sector and non-profit entities and contrasts the 
Spezzino and the Altmark approaches in detail (§3). Afterwards, it tackles the competitive 
distortions that can derive from a blanket exemption from procurement rules for third sector, 
non-profit entities and its incompatibility with the rules of Directive 2014/24 on public 
procurement (§4). Some tentative conclusions follow (§5). 
2. Limited clarity and new uncertainty as to the rules applicable to the procurement and 
financing of public services provided by voluntary (third sector, non-profit) entities 
In view of the Spezzino Judgment, the rules applicable to the provision of emergency 
ambulance services are definitely clear as mud, and such uncertainty carries beyond this 
specific type of services. In the case at hand, the applicants challenged an Italian law whereby 
emergency ambulance services must be awarded on a preferential basis and by direct award, 
without any advertising, to certain voluntary bodies. This rule has, ultimately, constitutional 
protection in Italy, as “the Italian Republic has incorporated into its constitution the principle 
of voluntary action by its citizens. Thus [it] provides that citizens, acting individually or in an 
association, may participate in activities of public interest with the support of the public 
authorities, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity”.16 
The applicants’ argument was not necessarily of a constitutional nature, but rather that 
freedom of establishment is unduly restricted by a preferential scheme that completely 
excludes the tendering out of those ambulance services. They brought forward arguments 
based on general free movement provisions, public procurement rules and competition rules. 
The latter arguments based on competition law were not examined because the CJEU 
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considered that the public procurement analysis made it unnecessary.
17
 Hence, the Spezzino 
Judgment exclusively rested on internal market and public procurement legal grounds. 
In my view, if read paragraph by paragraph, the reasoning of the CJEU is accurate 
and technically precise, but the overall Spezzino Judgment is too timid in spelling out the 
conditions for the application of the “public service exception” under art 106(2) TFEU (or 
otherwise) to the direct award of emergency ambulance services to voluntary action 
associations—and, more generally, to third sector, non-profit institutions. I will try to 
summarise my criticism and doubts as succinctly as possible, as well as to avoid issues 
generally concerned with fundamental freedoms and their restriction. 
2.1. Limited clarity depending on level of application of procurement rules 
On the bright side, some positions of the CJEU can be spelled out and actually create some 
clarity on the scope of rules applicable to decisions to reserve the award of public services 
contracts for ambulance services. The CJEU delineated three scenarios depending on the 
applicability of secondary EU public procurement law or not. 
(A) When fully applicable, both Directive 2004/18
18
 and Directive 2014/24,
19
 
preclude legislation which provides that the local authorities are to entrust the provision of 
urgent and emergency ambulance services on a preferential basis and by direct award, 
without any advertising, to the voluntary bodies mentioned in the agreement.
20
 However, 
Directive 2004/18 did not automatically apply in full to ambulance services [see (B) below] 
and article 10(h) of Directive 2014/24 clearly excludes these contracts from its scope of 
application.
21
 Hence, this clear position is not that useful in practice because emergency 
ambulance services are not covered by secondary EU public procurement law provisions. 
When it comes to other social and special services, the light touch regime in articles 74 to 77 
of Directive 2014/24 also imposes limited obligations and actually would cover a reservation 
system like the one challenged in Spezzino, provided certain conditions laid down in article 
77 are fulfilled.
22
 Hence, going forward, it is hard to envisage a clear scenario where the 
procurement Directives would actually be fully applicable in a way as to actually prevent a 
system of reservation of contracts for this type of social and special services. 
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(B) Where the Directives are not fully applicable (ie where contracts can be tendered 
under part B services rules under dir 2004/18, or under the special regime for social services 
under arts 74-76 dir 2014/24), if the contract is of cross-border interest,
23
 the general 
principles of transparency and equal treatment flowing from articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU 
would be applicable
24
 (as well as their specification in art 18 dir 2014/24, as per art 76 dir 
2014/24). In that case, it is also clear that such a preferential scheme would run contrary to 
the Directives, which are: “intended to ensure the free movement of services and the opening-
up to competition in the Member States which is undistorted and as wide as possible”.25 
However, the CJEU only considers that the scheme would result in indirect discrimination 
susceptible of objective justification. Indeed, the CJEU considers that  
such legislation excludes for-profit entities from an essential part of the market concerned […] the 
award, in the absence of any transparency, of a contract to an undertaking located in the same Member 
State as the contracting authority amounts to a difference in treatment to the detriment of undertakings 
which might be interested in that contract but are situated in another Member State. Unless it is 
justified by objective circumstances, such a difference in treatment, which, by excluding all 
undertakings located in another Member State, operates mainly to the detriment of the latter 
undertakings, amounts to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, prohibited under Articles 
49 TFEU and 56 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Ireland, EU:2007:676, 
paragraphs 30 and 31; Commission v Italy, EU:C:2007:729, paragraph 64; and Commission v Italy, 
EU:C:2008:102, paragraph 66).
26
 
In my view, this analysis based on nationality is too lenient and the CJEU should have 
focussed on the direct discrimination between for-profit and non-profit organisations 
(regardless of nationality). In the end, an Austrian or French non-profit organisation that had 
been interested in the contracts for emergency ambulance services in Italy would also most 
likely have been excluded by the Italian scheme challenged in the Spezzino case and, 
consequently, a stronger clash between these measures and the general requirements derived 
from free movement rules should have been acknowledged.
27
 Hence, the additional clarity of 
this analytical framework also seems limited. 
(C) Implicitly, then, where the Directives do not apply at all but the contract is still of 
cross-border interest (ie the new likely situation under art 10(h) dir 2014/24), the award of the 
contract is ‘merely’ subjected to the (residual/general) requirements of articles 49 TFEU and 
56 TFEU. In that case (not expressly assessed in the Spezzino Judgment), the contracting 
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authority would still need to go through the assessment under the market access test generally 
applicable to restrictions of freedom of establishment.
28
 
Hence, if the contract is of cross-border interest, there are always concerns and 
constraints derived from EU law (either general, or the specific rules of public procurement). 
Nonetheless, they are of varying degrees of intensity and it looks as if under Directive 
2014/24, the award of service contracts for emergency ambulance services (exclusively, or 
for most of their value if the contracts include other sorts of ambulance services) will 
exclusively be governed by the general rules on freedom of establishment. This is not to say 
that the rules applicable to their award are clear, but the general framework is set. 
2.2. Increased uncertainty as to the rules applicable to the procurement and financing of 
public services provided by voluntary (third sector, non-profit) entities 
On the shady side, once the potential incompatibility with EU public procurement or general 
free movement law is established (and, really, there seems to be no escape to scenarios A to 
C discussed above, except if the contract has no cross-border interest whatsoever—and, on 
that, see the Ancona Judgment),
29
 the CJEU will apply a Sodemare-like test because the 
provision of ambulance services falls within the (very broad) remit of the organisation of 
healthcare and social security systems.
30
 In that case, then, it will be particularly important to 
bear in mind that, as the CJEU has repeatedly stressed, “EU law does not detract from the 
power of the Member States to organise their public health and social security systems”,31 
and that “it is for the Member States, which have a discretion in the matter, to decide on the 
degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which that 
degree of protection is to be achieved”.32 So far, so good. 
On the dark side, however, and significantly departing from the more developed 
approach in Altmark for services of general economic interest, the CJEU has created an 
economically oriented safeguard that leaves too much room for manoeuvre—particularly due 
to the substitution of arguments of economic efficiency or cost-effectiveness (Altmark) with 
arguments of budgetary efficiency (Spezzino), as discussed below (§3). Implicitly accepting 
that emergency ambulance services are not of economic interest, but simply social services, 
the CJEU has created a new test for the assessment of their entrustment and financing by 
ruling that 
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Having regard to the general principle of EU law on the prohibition of abuse of rights (see, by analogy, 
judgment in 3M Italia, C‑417/10, EU:C:2012:184, paragraph 33), the application of that legislation 
cannot be extended to cover the wrongful practices of voluntary associations or their members. Thus, 
the activities of voluntary associations may be carried out by the workforce only within the limits 
necessary for their proper functioning. As regards the reimbursement of costs, it must be ensured that 
profit making, even indirect, cannot be pursued under the cover of a voluntary activity and that 
volunteers may be reimbursed only for expenditure actually incurred for the activity performed, within 
the limits laid down in advance by the associations themselves.
33
 
In my view, this is way too timid. Indeed, the CJEU constructs a rather weak 
safeguard by not focussing at all in the economic efficiency or cost-effectiveness of the 
voluntary activities (which, even on a non-profit, reimbursement basis can be extremely 
inefficient) and imposes a sort of “anti-fraud” test that misses the point. In order to ensure 
compatibility with State aid provisions (which should not have been set aside so quickly),
34
 
an efficiency-based test like the one existing in the fourth condition of Altmark should have 
been imposed (see below §3). Moreover, the CJEU shows excessive deference towards the 
voluntary sector by de facto allowing for a special treatment that it had been opposing in 
previous case law (below §4). 
3. How to coordinate Altmark and Spezzino, if at all possible? 
As mentioned above (§1 and §2.2), the Spezzino Judgment allows for unlimited financial 
support to the voluntary sector organisations providing a public service on the basis of 
compliance with two conditions. First, their activities need to be constrained by a legal and 
contractual framework that ensures that they “actually contribute to the social purpose and 
the pursuit of the objectives of the good of the community and budgetary efficiency”.35 And, 
second, “it must be ensured that profit making, even indirect, cannot be pursued under the 
cover of a voluntary activity”.36 The first condition is relevant for its departure from the 
Altmark test for the assessment of the existence of State aid to providers of public services. 
The second one is relevant as a safeguard for the special treatment afforded under Spezzino 
and will be assessed later (§4). 
The creation of a special test of “contribution to budgetary efficiency” in (apparent) 
derogation of the standard Altmark test of comparing the cost structure of the public service 
provider with that of a “typically efficient undertaking” is inapt (or at least misleading) for 
the purposes of the application of the public mission exemption under Article 106(2) TFEU 
and, failing that, also for State aid analysis under Article 107(1) TFEU.
37
 It is very hard to 
make sense of what the CJEU actually means by “contribution to budgetary efficiency”. In 
the Spezzino Judgment itself, the assessment of the compatibility of the regime with Articles 
49 and 56 TFEU under an objective justification argument based on an indirect 
discrimination of the undertakings not covered by the preferential regime (above §2.1), is 
premised on the following concatenation of reasoning and arguments: 
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not only the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of a social security system may 
constitute per se an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the 
freedom to provide services, but also the objective of maintaining, on grounds of public health, a 
balanced medical and hospital service open to all may also fall within one of the derogations, on 
grounds of public health in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection 
(see to that effect, judgment in Stamatelaki, C‑444/05, EU:C:2007:231, paragraphs 30 and 31 and the 
case-law cited). Thus, measures which aim, first, to meet the objective of guaranteeing in the territory 
of the Member State concerned sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality 
medical treatment and, secondly, [to] assist in ensuring the desired control of costs and prevention, as 
far as possible, of any wastage of financial, technical and human resources are also covered (see to that 
effect judgment in Commission v Germany, EU:C:2008:492, paragraph 61).
38
 
a Member State, in the context of its discretion to decide the level of protection of public health and to 
organise its social security system, may take the view that recourse to voluntary associations is 
consistent with the social purpose of the […] services and may help to control costs relating to those 
services.
39
 
I submit that the exact same arguments would have been made regarding the 
assessment under Article 106(2) TFEU as to the justification of the exclusion of competition 
law rules for the purposes of enabling the undertaking to provide the public service it had 
been entrusted with. In that regard, it seems rather obvious to me that the CJEU seems to 
assume that simply because they are non-profit and, consequently, they do not (should not) 
impose mark-ups in the prices (rectius, reimbursement claims) that form the basis of the 
financial support they receive, voluntary (third sector, non-profit) entities are ideally placed 
to prevent wastage of financial resources and to help control costs relating to those services. 
This is hardly acceptable at face value and, as Advocate General Wahl explicitly addressed in 
his Opinion in Spezzino, the legal reservation of the contract and the suppression of any 
competition, even only between non-profit organisations, makes it very plausible that the 
scheme of direct award of contracts challenged in the Spezzino case “would seem usually to 
work to the detriment of public finances”.40 Hence, a substantive test is clearly needed. 
At this point, there are two options to give meaning to the test of test of “contribution 
to budgetary efficiency” derived from Spezzino. The first one would be to take the pain of 
going beyond the literal tenor of the Judgment and the general flair of the case and reconcile 
the Spezzino test with Altmark on the simple (economic) basis that a voluntary sector entity 
can only make a contribution to actual budgetary efficiency if it does not require more 
support than a for-profit organisation. Or, in other words, a voluntary sector is only making a 
positive “contribution to budgetary efficiency” if the compensation it receives in 
reimbursement for its direct costs and the corresponding proportion of the indirect costs 
derived from providing the public service is comparable (ie equal or lower) to that 
“determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and 
adequately provided with [material] means […] so as to be able to meet the necessary public 
service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into 
account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations”, as per 
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Altmark. Or, even more simply, if it is recognised that the only way in which a voluntary 
(third sector, non-profit) organisation can contribute to budgetary efficiency is by ensuring 
that overall it is equally costly (or cheaper) than an alternative (for-profit) provider. If this 
was the accepted interpretation of the Spezzino test and its coordination with the Altmark test, 
the only criticism for the CJEU would be its almost inscrutable lack of clarity. Moreover, as 
AG Wahl also stressed, this would seem not to be against the opportunities for voluntary, 
non-profit organisations to overcome the test
41
 due to “the fact that, in all likelihood, 
voluntary organisations which merely ask for reimbursement of the expenses incurred, and 
which are run in a reasonably effective manner, should, in principle, often be able to prevail 
[…] simply by virtue of their cost-effectiveness”.42 
However, that interpretation seems very unlikely, to say the least. It seems much more 
feasible that there will be no connection whatsoever between the Spezzino and the Altmark 
tests and, consequently, there will be no effective economic assessment of the “contribution 
to budgetary efficiency” that voluntary sector organisations actually make in the provision of 
public services. It would not be surprising if such contribution would simply be based on the 
assumption that, by employing an unknown proportion of unpaid volunteers and not being 
profit oriented, they allow the State to save financial resources or, if we are to play with 
words, to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage. If this is the result of the Spezzino 
Judgment, then, Member States will have a strong incentive to restrict or limit their public 
services markets to local third sector, non-profit providers, with the ensuing negative effects 
for the internal market derived from the closure of such public service markets to all other 
potential providers. However, assessing those effects exceeds the scope of this comment. 
This approach could find political support on the basis of the social market economy 
approach resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon. However, it will also create significant legal 
uncertainty in view of the need to overturn significant volumes of case law of the CJEU that 
have been denying any preferential treatment for non-profit organisation, particularly in the 
public procurement field. This leads to the analysis of the “anti-fraud” clause created by the 
CJEU in its Spezzino Judgment. 
4. Is the voluntary sector, or non-profit economic activity, special all of a sudden? 
As a safeguard against the abuse of the favourable treatment that Spezzino allows for non-
profit organisations in the award of public services contracts (primarily for emergency 
ambulance services, but not only), the CJEU included an “anti-fraud” requirement whereby 
other than ensuring a contribution to budgetary efficiency, “it must be ensured that profit 
making, even indirect, cannot be pursued under the cover of a voluntary activity”.43 In my 
view, this is a reasonable safeguard but it is too vague and, even if interpreted in strict terms, 
it fails to tackle other risks derived from the favourable treatment to non-profit organisations. 
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 Spezzino, 62; emphasis added. 
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Firstly, it is hard to understand what the CJEU means by ensuring that even indirect 
profits are not pursued under the cover of a voluntary activity. If the CJEU is concerned with 
overall, end of year (distributable) profits, then the threshold is set too low and it is very 
unlikely that any voluntary, non-profit organisation will ever report having an unspent 
surplus. However, if the CJEU aimed to impose very strict assessment of whether the 
voluntary organisation has any operating margin at all, then the threshold is probably too high 
and disregards the unavoidable fact that cost accounting (by means of which indirect costs are 
allocated between activities) is not an exact science and, consequently, there is always room 
for (marginal) indirect profit or margin to be obtained year on year. Moreover, it is also 
unclear whether a reinvestment of any profits in the provision of the public service would fall 
foul of the Spezzino “anti-fraud” requirement or not. Hence, even in its strict terms, this 
caveat is problematic and difficult to apply. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the CJEU seems to forget its previous case law 
excluding the possibility of providing favourable treatment to non-profit organisations in the 
award of public contracts. As already mentioned, its traditional position has been that 
“despite their status as social solidarity institutions carrying out non-profit activities [if 
public sector providers] are not barred from engaging in economic activity in competition 
with other economic operators”, they shall not be afforded any special treatment when it 
comes to the award of public contracts or public (financial) support.
44
 The ultimate argument 
has always been that the for-profit or non-profit nature of undertakings is irrelevant for the 
purposes of the application of EU public procurement
45
 and competition law. However, the 
Spezzino Judgment overlooks this issue completely and opens new roads for the creation of a 
special public procurement regime for the non-profit sector that may be magnified if Member 
States make an intense use of the light touch regime in Articles 74 to 77 of Directive 
2014/24—and, in particular, of the possibility to reserve contracts under Article 77 thereof. 
5. Tentative conclusion 
As a brief conclusion, it seems clear to me that the Spezzino Judgment has created a 
significant area of uncertainty for the application of EU public procurement and competition 
law. Its impact on the effectiveness of the State aid rules for public services can be very 
significant and not necessarily positive, and it can also contribute to the creation of a public 
procurement black hole when it comes to the award of public services contracts. 
Consequently, in my view, it is an unwelcome development of EU economic law and it 
should be reversed soon. In any case, there are possibilities for the creative realignment of 
Spezzino and previous case law, particularly Altmark, along the lines discussed above. 
National courts would be well advised to explore those avenues in order to maintain a much 
needed economic rationale in the development of the law applicable to this important part of 
public sector provision and, ultimately, towards contributing to the financial viability of the 
welfare State. 
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